Abstract-We consider a distributed stochastic approxi mation (SA) scheme for computing an equilibrium of a stochastic Nash game. Standard SA schemes employ dimin ishing steplength sequences that are square summable but not summable. Such requirements provide a little or no guidance for how to leverage Lipschitzian and monotonicity properties of the problem and naive choices (such as rk = 1/ k) generally do not preform uniformly well on a breadth of problems.
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Abstract-We consider a distributed stochastic approxi mation (SA) scheme for computing an equilibrium of a stochastic Nash game. Standard SA schemes employ dimin ishing steplength sequences that are square summable but not summable. Such requirements provide a little or no guidance for how to leverage Lipschitzian and monotonicity properties of the problem and naive choices (such as rk = 1/ k) generally do not preform uniformly well on a breadth of problems.
While a centralized adaptive stepsize SA scheme is proposed in [1] for the optimization framework, such a scheme provides no freedom for the agents in choosing their own stepsizes.
Thus, a direct application of centralized stepsize schemes is impractical in solving Nash games. Furthermore, extensions to game-theoretic regimes where players may independently choose step length sequences are limited to recent work by Koshal et al. [2] . Motivated by these shortcomings, we present a distributed algorithm in which each player updates his steplength based on the previous steplength and some problem parameters. The steplength rules are derived from minimizing an upper bound of the errors associated with players' decisions.
It is shown that these rules generate sequences that converge almost surely to an equilibrium of the stochastic Nash game.
Importantly, variants of this rule are suggested where players independently select steplength sequences while abiding by an overall coordination requirement. Preliminary numerical results are seen to be promising.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a class of stochastic Nash games in which ev ery player solves a stochastic convex program parametrized by adversarial strategies. Consider an N -person stochastic Nash game in which the ith player solves the parametrized convex problem (1) where X-i denotes the collection {Xj, j -I-i} of decisions of all players other than player i. For each i, the vector �i : Sli -+ jRn, is a random vector with a probability distribution on some set, while the function E [Ji(Xi,X-i'�i)l is strongly convex in Xi for all X-i E IT j# i X j ' For every i, the set Xi � jRni is closed and convex. We focus on the resulting stochastic variational inequality (VI) and consider the development of distributed stochastic approxi mation schemes that rely on adaptive steplength sequences. Stochastic approximation techniques have a long tradition. First proposed by Robbins and Monro [3] for differentiable Yousefian and functions and Ermoliev [4] - [6] , significant effort has been applied towards theoretical and algorithmic examination of such schemes (cf. [7] , [8] ). Yet, there has been markedly little on the application of such techniques to solution of stochastic variational inequalities. Exceptions include the work by Jiang and Xu [9] , and more recently by Koshal et al. [2] . The latter, in particular, develops a single timescale stochastic approximation scheme for precisely the class of problems being studied here viz. monotone stochastic Nash games.
Standard stochastic approximation schemes provide little guidance regarding the choice of a steplength sequence, apart from requiring that the sequence, denoted by bk}, satisfies 2:%:1 'Yk = 00 and 2:%:1 'Y � < 00. This paper is motivated by the need to develop adaptive steplength sequences that can be independently chosen by players under a limited coordination, while guaranteeing the overall convergence of the scheme. Adaptive stepsizes have been effectively used in gradient and subgradient algorithms. Vrahatis et al. [10] presented a class of gradient algorithms with adaptive step sizes for unconstrained minimization. Spall [11] developed a general adaptive SA algorithm based on using a simultaneous perturbation approach for estimating the Hessian matrix. Cicek et al. [12] considered the Kiefer-Wolfowitz (KW) SA algorithm and derived general upper bounds on its mean-squared error, together with an adaptive version of the KW algorithm. Ram et al. [13] considered distributed stochastic subgradient algorithms for convex optimization problems and studied the effects of stochastic errors on the convergence of the proposed algorithm. Lizarraga et al. [14] considered a family of two person Multi-Plant game and developed Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium conditions based on the Robust Maximum Principle. More recently, Yousefian et al. [1] , [15] developed centralized adaptive stepsize SA schemes for solving stochastic optimization problems and variational inequalities. The main contribution of the current paper lies in developing a class of distributed adaptive stepsize rules for SA scheme in which each agent chooses its own stepsizes without any specific information regarding the policy employed by agents. This degree of freedom in choosing the stepsizes has not been addressed in the centralized schemes.
Before proceeding, we briefly motivate the question of distributed computation of Nash equilibria from two different standpoints: (i) First, the Nash game can be viewed as a com petitive analog of a stochastic multi-user convex optimiza tion problem of the form minxEx 2:�1 E [!i(Xi, X-i, �i)l· Furthermore, under the assumption that equilibria of the associated stochastic Nash game are efficient, our scheme provides a distributed framework for computing solutions to this problem. In such a setting, we may prescribe that players employ stochastic approximation schemes since the Nash game represents an engineered construct employed for computing solutions; (ii) A second perspective is one drawn from a bounded rationality approach towards distributed computation of Nash equilibria. A fully rational avenue for computing equilibria suggests that each player employs a best response mapping in updating strategies, based on what the competing players are doing. Yet, when faced by computational or time constraints, players may instead take a gradient step. We work in precisely this regime but allow for flexibility in terms of the steplengths chosen by the players.
In this paper, we consider the solution of a stochastic Nash game whose equilibria are completely captured by a stochas tic variational inequality with a strongly monotone mapping. Motivated by the need for efficient distributed simulation methods for computing solutions to such problems, we present a distributed scheme in which each player employs an adaptive rule for prescribing steplengths. Importantly, these rules can be implemented with relatively little coordination by any given player and collectively lead to iterates that are shown to converge to the unique equilibrium in an almost sure sense. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the formulation of a stochastic Nash games in which every player solves a stochastic convex problem. In Section III, we show the almost-sure convergence of the SA algorithm under specified assumptions. In Section IV, motivated by minimizing a suitably defined error bound, we develop an adaptive step length stochastic approximation framework in which every player updates his step length by leveraging a rule that adapts to problem parameters. It is shown that the choice of adaptive steplength rules can be obtained independently by each player under a limited coor dination. Finally, in Section V, we provide some numerical results from a stochastic flow management game drawn from a communication network setting. Note that the proofs of the results in this article are omitted and may be found in [16] .
Notation: Throughout this paper, a vector x is assumed to be a column vector. We write xT to denote the transpose of a vector x. I lxll denotes the Euclidean vector norm, i.e., I lxll = VxTx. We use IIx(x) to denote the Euclidean projection of a vector x on a set X, i.e., I lx -IIx(x)11 = min Y Ex I lx -yll .
Vector 9 is a subgradient of a convex function f with domain domf at x E domf when f(x) + gT(x -x) :s: f(x) for all x E domf. The set of all subgradients of f at x is denoted by and use E[ z] to denote the expectation of a random variable z.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we present (sufficient) conditions associ ated with equilibrium points of the stochastic Nash game defined by (1) . The equilibrium conditions of this game can be characterized by a stochastic variational inequality problem denoted by VI( X, F), where
with x � (Xl, ... ,X N) T and Xi E Xi<:;; jRn, for i = 1, ... , N. Given a set X <:;; jRn and a single-valued mapping F : X -7 jRn, then a vector x* E X solves a variational inequality VI( X, F ) , if (x -x* f F(x*) ;::: 0 for all x E X.
(3)
Let n = L� l ni , and note that when the sets Xi are convex and closed for all i, the set X E jRn is closed and convex.
In the context of solving the stochastic variational in equality VI( X, F) in (2)- (3), suppose each player employs a stochastic approximation scheme for given by
for all k ;::: 0 and i = 1, ... ,N, where 'Tk,i > 0 is the stepsize of the ith player at iteration k, Xk = (Xk,l Xk,2 ... Xk,N )T, �k = (�k,l �k,2 ... �k,N) T, Fi = E[\7xJi(X'�i)] , and In this section, we present conditions under which algo rithm (4) converges almost surely to the solution of game (1) under suitable assumptions on the mapping. Also, we develop a distributed variant of a standard stochastic ap proximation scheme and provide conditions on the steplength sequences that lead to almost-sure convergence of the iterates to the unique solution. Our assumptions include requirements on the set X and the mapping F. Remark: The strong monotonicity is assumed to hold throughout the paper. Although the convergence results may still hold with a weaker assumption, such as strict monotonic ity, but the stepsize policy in this paper leverages the strong monotonicity parameter which prescribes a parametrized stepsize rule. This is the main reason that we assumed the stronger version of monotonicity. In Section V, we present an example where such an assumption is satisfied.
Next we present an assumption of stepsizes employed by each player. We use the Robbins-Siegmund lemma in establishing the convergence of method (4), which can be found in [17] (cf. Lemma 10, page 49). 
k--+oo ak
The following lemma provides an error bound for algo rithm (4) under Assumption 1. (b) The sequence {Xk} generated by algorithm (6), con verges a.s. to the unique solution of VI(X, F ).
IV. A DISTRIBUTED ADAPTIVE STEPLENGTH SA SCHEME Stochastic approximation algorithms require stepsize se quences to be square summable but not summable. These algorithms provide little advice regarding the choice of such sequences. One of the most common choices has been the harmonic steplength rule which takes the form of rk = * where e > 0 is a constant. Although, this choice guarantees almost-sure convergence, it does not leverage problem pa rameters. Numerically, it has been observed that such choices can perform quite poorly in practice. Motivated by this short coming, we present a distributed adaptive steplength scheme for algorithm (4) which guarantees almost -sure convergence of Xk to the unique solution of VI(X, F). It is derived from the minimizer of a suitably defined error bound and leads to a recursive relation; more specifically, at each step, the new stepsize is calculated using the stepsize from the preceding iteration and problem parameters. To begin our analysis, we consider the result of Proposition la for all k ;::: 0: (b) The sequence {Xk} generated by algorithm (4), converges a.s. to the unique solution of VI(X, F ).
Consider now a special form of algorithm (4) corresponding to the case when all players employ the same stepsize, i.e., rk,i = rk for all k. Then, the algorithm (4) reduces to the following: (9) where eo is a positive scalar, 'T ) is the strong monotonicity parameter and //2 is the upper bound for the conditional second moments of the error norms I l w kll.
Now, let us consider the stepsize sequence {ok} given by
In what follows, we often abbreviate ek(oO," ., ok-d by ek whenever this is unambiguous. The next proposition shows that the lower bound sequence of "'(k i given by (10)- (11) .
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mInImIzes t e errors ek over , (1+;3) 2 L 2 . We have just provided an analysis in terms of the lower bound sequence {Ok}' We can conduct a similar analysis for {fk} and obtain the corresponding adaptive stepsize scheme using the following relation: 
Using relation (12) and following similar approach in Propo sition 2, we obtain the sequence {fAJ given by
for all k 2: 1. (14) Note that the adaptive stepsize sequence given by (13) (14) converges to zero and moreover, it is not summable but squared summable (cf. [1] , Proposition 3). In the fol lowing lemma, we derive a relation between two recursive sequences, which we use later to obtain our main recursive stepsize scheme. (10)- (11) and (13)- (14) and eo < 2{:. 
where ri is an arbitrary parameter associated with ith player such that ri E [1,1 + rz L 2 c ], C is an arbitrary fixed constant o < C < ¥, L denotes the Lipschitz constant of mapping F, and // is the upper bound given by Assumption 3 such that D < V2f. Then, the following hold: (a) 'tk,i = 'tk,; for any i j = 1 ... Nand k > O. (10) (11) and (13)- (14) respectively.
(c) The sequence {Xk} generated by algorithm (4) con verges a.s. to the unique solution of stochastic VI( X, F). 
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we report the results of our numerical experiments on a stochastic bandwidth-sharing problem in communication networks (Sec. V-A). We compare the per formance of the distributed adaptive stepsize SA scheme (DASA) given by (15) - (16) with that of SA schemes with harmonic stepsize sequences (HSA), where agents use the stepsize � at iteration k. More precisely, we consider three different values of the parameter e, i. e., e = 0.1, 1, and 10.
This diversity of choices allows us to observe the sensitivity of the HSA scheme to different settings of the parameters.
A. A bandwidth-sharing problem in computer networks
We consider a communication network where users com pete for the bandwidth. Such a problem can be captured by an optimization framework (cf. is the set of routes assigned to the i-th user, X i (r) and �i (r) are the r-th element of the decision vector X i and the random vector �i, respectively. We assume that �i( r ) is drawn from a uniform distribution for each i and r and the links have limited capacities given by b.
We may define the routing matrix A that describes the relation between set of routes R = {I, 2, ... , 9} and set of links L = {I, 2, ... , 20}. Assume that A Z r = 1 if route r E R goes through link l ELand A Z r = 0 otherwise. Using this matrix, the capacity constraints of the links can be described by Ax :::; b.
We formulate this model as a stochastic optimization problem given by (17) i =l subject to Ax :::; b, and X 2: 0, where c ( x) is the network congestion cost. We consider this cost of the form c (x ) = IIAx I1 2 . Problem (17) is a convex optimization problem and the optimality conditions can be stated as a variational inequality given by \l f (x *) ), and S(3), while its performance deteriorates in settings S(10), S(ll), and S(12). A similar discussion holds for other two HSA schemes. A good instance of this argument is shown in Figure 2 and 3. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We considered distributed monotone stochastic Nash games where each player minimizes a convex function on a closed convex set. We first formulated the problem as a stochastic VI and then showed that under suitable conditions, for a strongly monotone and Lipschitz mapping, the SA scheme guarantees almost-sure convergence to the solution.
Next, motivated by the naive stepsize choices of standard SA schemes, we proposed a class of distributed adaptive steplength rules where each player can choose his own stepsize independent of the other players from a specified range. We showed that this scheme provides almost-sure convergence and also minimizes a suitably defined error bound of the SA algorithm. Numerical experiments reported in Section V suggest that the scheme performs well on a broad set of problem settings.
